The global prevalence of civil war, 1946-2009
While civil wars proliferated during the Cold War, their numbers have declined in the post-Cold War period. What is more, new conflicts breaking out since 1990 have much shorter average durations than their Cold War predecessors. What explains changing trends in the prevalence and duration of civil war?
My book project answers this question by exploring how inter-state competition affects intra-state conflict through the mechanism of competitive intervention--two-sided, simultaneous military assistance from different third-party states to both government and rebel combatants. I explain the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes, describe the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners, and link their varying prevalence to international systemic change.
In doing so, I move beyond popular anecdotes of "proxy wars" by deriving theoretically-grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating competitive intervention in civil wars. I also uncover a heretofore overlooked feature of this form of intervention--namely, that "not losing" is often more important than "winning" from the perspective of third-party interveners under the shadow of inadvertent escalation.
To test my theory, I combine statistical analyses with detailed case studies, fieldwork, and archival research. My results shed new light on the international dimensions of civil war, address ongoing debates concerning the utility of military aid as a foreign policy instrument, and inform policy prescriptions aimed at resolving some of today's most violent conflicts.
My book project answers this question by exploring how inter-state competition affects intra-state conflict through the mechanism of competitive intervention--two-sided, simultaneous military assistance from different third-party states to both government and rebel combatants. I explain the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes, describe the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners, and link their varying prevalence to international systemic change.
In doing so, I move beyond popular anecdotes of "proxy wars" by deriving theoretically-grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating competitive intervention in civil wars. I also uncover a heretofore overlooked feature of this form of intervention--namely, that "not losing" is often more important than "winning" from the perspective of third-party interveners under the shadow of inadvertent escalation.
To test my theory, I combine statistical analyses with detailed case studies, fieldwork, and archival research. My results shed new light on the international dimensions of civil war, address ongoing debates concerning the utility of military aid as a foreign policy instrument, and inform policy prescriptions aimed at resolving some of today's most violent conflicts.
